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Abstract—Distributed link-flooding attacks constitute a new
class of attacks with the potential to segment large areas of
the Internet. Their distributed nature makes detection and
mitigation very hard. This work proposes a novel framework
for the analytical modeling and optimal mitigation of such
attacks. The detection is modeled as a problem of relational
algebra, representing the association of potential attackers (bots)
to potential targets. The analysis seeks to optimally dissolve all
but the malevolent associations. The framework is implemented
at the level of online Traffic Engineering (TE), which is naturally
triggered on link-flooding events. The key idea is to continuously
re-route traffic in a manner that makes persistent participation
to link-flooding events highly improbable for any benign source.
Thus, bots are forced to adopt a suspicious behavior to remain
effective, revealing their presence. The load-balancing objective
of TE is not affected at all. Extensive simulations on various
topologies validate our analytical findings.
Index Terms—DDoS, link-flooding, analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
DDoS attacks are well-known within the Internet community.
For example, the attack against Spamhaus in 2013 was a
powerful attack that inflicted more than 300 Gbit/s of malicious
traffic upon the intended target [1]. However, researchers have
recently shed light on new types of link-flooding attacks that can
operate at Internet scales and are extremely difficult to detect
and mitigate [2], [3]. The objective of these attacks is to deplete
the bandwidth of certain network links, disconnecting entire
domains—even countries—from the Internet. In particular, the
Crossfire [2] attack is a stealthy and effective DDoS link-
flooding attack that uses bots with non-spoofed IP addresses
to send traffic to publicly accessible servers. While packets
stemming from these attack sources are seemingly legitimate,
their cumulative volume harms the intended victim in an
indirect way by flooding links and cutting off connectivity
towards its location. Each bot-to-server flow usually has very
low bandwidth, and is thus very hard to detect and filter.
On the defender’s side, Traffic Engineering (TE) is the
network process that reacts to link-flooding events, regardless
of their cause [4]. The TE module, hosting this process, is thus
a natural point to incorporate attack detection and mitigation
mechanisms. A TE process has two phases: i) the optimal
load calculation for each network path, and ii) the mapping
of specific traffic flows to paths in a manner upholding their
calculated optimal load [5]. The first phase represents the
This work was funded by the European Research Council via Grant Agreement
no. 338402, project ”NetVolution: Evolving Internet Routing”.
first TE priority, which is to ensure that the network load is
balanced, i.e., fairly distributed over all available paths. The
flow mapping phase has received limited focus in existing TE
solutions and is even random for all but elephant flows [6].
In the present paper the TE process is optimized for attack
detection, without altering its load-balancing objective. The
methodology consists in optimizing the flow mapping phase of
TE. The new optimal mapping ensures that a benign flow will
have the lowest probability of contributing to a future attack by
chance. Therefore, bots are forced to behave improbably over
time in order to remain effective. Internally, a novel analytical
framework based on relational algebra is employed to relate
bots to susceptible targets. In this aspect, the outlined TE
flow mapping maximizes the support of bot-to-target relations,
accentuating their presence over time.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper contributes the first
analytical model targeting Crossfire-like link-flooding attacks,
offering novel insights in this attack type. In addition, the
presented analysis and algorithm have general applicability
to multigraphs, multipath routing and generic bot behavior.
Multiple time-varying and mixed malicious/benign connections
per single bot are allowed. Furthermore, the analysis offers
insights in the topological attributes that affect the attack
and its mitigation. Moreover, the integration with existing
TE modules is seamless. Finally, given that the analysis is built
upon relational algebra principles, the proposed scheme lends
itself to a straightforward implementation based on well-known,
mature and scalable databases (e.g., SQL [7]).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A
description of the studied attack is given in Section II. The
proposed analytical framework is described in Section III,
while its algorithmic formulation is given in Section IV. The
simulation results follow in Section V, while the related work
is presented in Section VI. Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. ATTACK MODEL: REACTIVE CROSSFIRE
The attack that we study as a use case is a reactive version of
the Crossfire attack. In the classic Crossfire attack, the attacker
has a swarm of bots (or botnet) at his disposal, and seeks to
attack a certain area, called the target area. The goal is to cut
off Internet connectivity to this area. To achieve this, he assigns
his bots to send legitimate, low-rate traffic flows towards certain
public servers, the decoy servers. These servers are reached
over the same target links that connect the target area to the
Internet. Thus the bots send traffic along paths that lead to both
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Figure 1: Overview of the Crossfire attack concept.
the decoys and the target, cumulatively flooding the shared
target links. Traffic is sent only to the decoys, so that the target
cannot directly observe the flood. The knowledge base of the
attacker is mainly the link-map, i.e., the map of the links of
the victim network. The most loaded links along the paths
from the bots to the servers and from the bots to the target
are flooded. The concept is illustrated in Fig. 1; the decoys
can be random destinations that are on the appropriate paths
to the target. As an extension, we also assume that the attacker
monitors the network routes and reacts to any changes in the
link-map, including shifts of load and routing changes. These
changes may be possible defender’s reactions; the attacker thus
reiterates this process to harm the target anew.
While the attacker seeks to flood the target links, the defender
aims at alleviating the load from the flooded connections and
at finding and blocking any malicious traffic sources. While the
first objective is the same as the one employed by most modern
TE modules (i.e., balancing the load), the second one is much
harder to implement. In our framework, we thus assume the
following features for the defender’s process. First, he monitors
the network load and reacts to link-flooding events. Flood
detection can be based on approaches such as the one from
Xue et al. [8]. After the flood is known, the defender balances
the load by re-routing traffic destined to different destinations,
without though knowing the attacker’s classification (target,
decoys, benign servers). Moreover, he records sources that
are consistently present in link-flooding events, even after re-
routing. Sources that change their destination selection to adapt
to re-routing are particularly suspicious; that means that re-
routing has diverted their initial load away from the target
link(s), while they want to return and inflict damage. The idea
is that after such an interaction cycle between the attacker and
the defender, attack sources may become more identifiable
by exhibiting a behavior that is highly improbable for benign
sources. For example, benign (e.g., flash-crowd) load would
not re-adjust to routing changes, but it would use the same
popular destination(s) as before.
The defender must gradually collect evidence to support the
involvement of traffic sources in an attack towards a target,
while dealing with the proper allocation of bandwidth during
the attack via TE. The attacker’s classification of the target
and decoys, as well as the attacking bots should become more
and more visible after a number of attack/re-route interactions.
We substantiate this model analytically in Section III.
III. ANALYSIS
Below we formulate the detection problem via relational
algebra and study the effects of the attacker-defender interplay.
Then, the defender’s actions are analytically optimized.
Prerequisites. Assume a directed multigraph G(N , L)
comprising a set of nodes N and a set of directed links L.
A single node is denoted as n ∈ N and a single link as
l ∈ L. Each node n logically hosts a set of network-wide
unique entities, E(n). An entity e represents an IP address
or an IP prefix, depending on the required level of detection
granularity. Each E(n) set is connectable to any other entity
e ∈ E(n∗), n 6= n∗; inter-entity paths are based on the current
set of routing tables T of G, i.e., the routing configuration.
The attack detection process will eventually relate a set
of entities (e.g., botnet IP addresses) to a set of nodes (e.g.,
decoy servers). Therefore, we denote the associative relation,
r, between two generic sets S1 and S2 as:
r : S1
s−→ S2 (1)
where s ∈ R+ is the support of the relation. In general,
the −→ notation denotes ordered collocations of S1 and S2
elements within a stream of 2-tuple observations. The support
s essentially counts these collocations within the stream.
Let ‖S‖ denote the cardinality of a set S. We define the
L−specificity of relation (1) as ‖S1‖, and its R−specificity
as ‖S2‖. By definition, the following holds:
r1 ⊇ r2 ⇔ (S1 → S2) ⊇ (S3 → S4)⇒
{
S1 ⊇ S3
S2 ⊇ S4 (2)
A. Problem Formulation via Associative Relations
The analysis assumes a cycle of attacks followed by defense
actions. We study only the time moments when links have
been flooded; these moments are denoted as sequential time
steps t ∈ N. In addition, the described process may optionally
assume the existence of heuristics that classify link floods as
malevolent, filtering out natural causes like flash crowds [9].
An attack at time step t floods a set of links LA(t) ⊂ L,
affecting the connectivity of a set of nodes NA(t) ⊂ N . Let
EA(t) denote the set of all suspicious entities, defined as the
ones that are origins of traffic flows present in LA(t) which
did not exist at time t− 1. In other words, EA(t) contains the
entities that have launched new flows to be present in one or
more flooded links at time step t. Thus, for all time steps up
to t, we form the following associative relation:
rA(t) : ∪∀tEA(t) −→ ∪∀tNA(t) (3)
The goal of the defender at time step t is to deploy a new set
of routing tables effective until t+ 1, i.e., T (t+ 1), such that:
min {s} ∀r : e s→ n, r ⊂ rA(t) (4)
The defender assumes that all entities e ∈ ∪
∀t
EA(t) are
benevolent, i.e., flows originating from an entity e ∈ EA(t)
will not change their destination to affect n at time step t+ 1,
to the extent justified statistically by normal traffic patterns.
Thus he seeks to minimize the corresponding support to match
this assumption. In essence, the formulation of relation (4)
describes the construction of new routing tables, T (t+ 1), that
disrelate entities from nodes affected by link-flooding events.
The new T (t+ 1) assumes that all past e→ n relations were
coincidental and, therefore, their support should decrease with
high probability in the future. Relations that persist regardless
of this effort are treated as indications of an attack.
Definition of Support. At any given time step t, the
defender observes a set of LA(t) flooded links. With no loss
of generality, let LA(t) = {li, i = 1 . . . ‖LA‖}. Let Ei be the
set of suspicious entities over link li. We form the relations:
{ri(t) : Ei → li} , i = 1 . . . ‖LA‖ (5)
Moreover, let Ni denote the set of nodes which may receive
traffic via link li according to T (t), either as transit nodes or
as flow destinations. We express these relations as:{
r
′
i(t) : li → Ni
}
, i = 1 . . . ‖LA‖ (6)
Relations (5) and (6) can be combined by eliminating li:{
r
′′
i (t) : Ei → Ni
}
, i = 1 . . . ‖LA‖ (7)
Remark 1. The set r
′′
i (t) is used for filtering out links from
LA(t) that carry the same amount of information in terms
of attack detection. An attack may flood several links that
are sequential on a path, due to link capacity or link load
variations. In these cases, the detection process should consider
the most general of the r
′′
i (t) relations only, in order not to lose
information that is important to the attack detection process.
That is, links that are “shadowed” by other links on a path
and do not offer new insight should be left out. Therefore,
the remainder of the analysis will assume that all links li for
which ∃j : r′′j (t) ⊇ r
′′
i (t) have been filtered out of LA(t).
For each distinct e ∈ ⋃∀i Ei, (5) can be rewritten as:
e
s(e)−→ Le(t) = {li : e ∈ Ei} , s(e) = ‖Le(t)‖‖LA(t)‖ (8)
In a similar fashion, for each distinct n ∈ ⋃∀iNi, (6) yields:
n
s(n)−→ Ln(t) = {li : n ∈ Ni} , s(n) = ‖Ln(t)‖‖LA(t)‖ (9)
Combining (8) and (9) produces the specific relation:
e
s(e,n)−→ n, s(e, n) = ‖Le(t)∩Ln(t)‖
‖Le(t)∪Ln(t)‖−‖Le(t)∩Ln(t)‖
. (10)
Notice that s(e) expresses the probability of e acting as a bot
at time t, s(n) is the probability of n being an attack target at
time t, and s(e, n) is the probability of e attacking n at time
t. The optimization criterion (4) thus seeks to minimize the
total support of relations (8-10) over all time steps, i.e., the
probabilities Π∀tst(e), Π∀tst(n) and Π∀tst(e, n).
B. Effects of Attacker’s Actions on the Detection Process
A smart attacker may consider that he may be tracked. Thus,
he needs to take measures to obfuscate his presence. The
existence of a bot entity may be obfuscated by:
1) Not participating to an attack at every step t.
2) Attacking targets beyond the intended ones.
These approaches affect the L and R specificity of the relations
(10), as shown in the following Lemmas.
Lemma 2. Limited entity participation to an attack reduces
the L-specificity of a relation e
s(e,n)−→ n.
Proof: Assume an attack towards node n, consistently
launched by a an entity e over time steps 0 to t, leading to
the relation e
s(e,n)−→ n. Assume that the same attack is now
launched by a multiset of entities, E , with ‖E‖ = t, where an
entity e ∈ E is allowed to attack at one time step only. Any
cycle of size ‖E‖ can be used to deduce the exact order. The
updated relation is now E s(e,n)−→ n, yielding the same support,
but a decreased L-specificity of ‖E‖ > 1.
Lemma 3. Sporadically attacking targets beyond the intended
one reduces the R-specificity of a relation e
s(e,n)−→ n.
Proof: Similar to Lemma 2, using a N multiset.
Attacks employing Lemmas 2 and 3 can also be combined to
yield relations with L and R specificity that is too low to be of
any practical use. For example, such relations may produce only
coarse indications of the form: “A network receives too much
load originating from beyond its Internet-facing gateways”.
Notice that an attack that employs only Lemma 2 will still
be R-specific via relation (9), potentially enabling TE-based
defense measures despite the unspecificity of the attack sources.
Similarly, an attack that only uses Lemma 3 for obfuscation will
still be L-specific via relation (8), enabling direct mitigation,
e.g., via entity filtering or blacklisting.
However, obfuscating an attack via Lemmas 2 and 3 also
comes with a price, regardless of their usage combination.
An attacker must have an increased number of entities at
his disposal, in order to efficiently use Lemma 2. Likewise,
attacking extraneous targets (see Lemma 3) requires the use of
additional entities as well. Given that the bandwidth (and the
number of entities) required to flood a link is closely related to
the TE choices of the victim, we proceed to study the effects
of classic TE objectives to the specificity of relations (10).
C. Effects of Classic TE Objectives on the Detection Process
A usual TE objective is to react to link congestion/flooding
events, redistributing the network load as equally as possible
among the available routes [4]. This goal is most commonly
expressed as the minimization of the maximum link utilization
throughout the network, given the present traffic flow between
each node pair [5]. The process is split into two stages:
1) Optimal calculation of path load. This stage receives
as inputs the current traffic matrix and a set of possible paths
connecting each pair of networked entities. It then produces
the optimal aggregate load that each route should carry. This
problem can be formulated as a Linear Program (LP) as follows.
Let Me,e′ be the current traffic matrix containing the data rates
between any two entities e and e′. Let the triplet 〈e, e′, k〉 , k =
1 . . .K index each of the K available paths that can connect
the entities e, e′ (K can be a function of e, e′). Furthermore,
let f〈e,e′,k〉 represent the fraction of Me,e′ over path 〈e, e′, k〉.
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Figure 2: Types of attack responses to a link load-minimizing TE scheme.
An attacker may move: i) “vertically”, flooding the additional links deployed
via TE, or ii) “horizontally”, either nearing or distancing from the target area.
The objective of stage 1 is then achieved as follows [6]:
minimize: U
subject to:
∀e,e′ :
∑
∀k f〈e,e′,k〉 = 1
∀〈e,e′,k〉,∀l∈〈e,e′,k〉: ∑∀e,e′Me,e′f〈e,e′,k〉 ≤ U · Cl
(11)
where Cl is the nominal capacity of link l and U ∈ [0, 1] a
helper variable. The first condition expresses the conservation
of the traffic load, while the second one ensures that the load
of each link is within its capacity constraint.
2) Mapping of entity pairs to paths. Given the current
traffic matrix Me,f , this stage maps pairs of entities 〈e, e′〉 to
paths 〈e, e′, k〉 in order to match the optimal f〈e,e′,k〉 values
produced in stage 1, after running the LP of formulation (11).
It is worth noting that there exist single-stage TE approaches
based on metaheuristics (e.g., Genetic Algorithms), which
attempt the same optimization [10], [11]. However, their
performance is generally inferior to the LP-based approach.
The following remarks can be made on the relation between
the TE module and the attack detection process. i) Since the TE
is triggered on link congestion events, it will also be the first to
respond to link flooding attacks as well. Therefore, the TE is a
promising point for introducing detection-oriented mechanisms.
ii) It is mandatory that the TE relieves the congested links,
regardless of any actions pertaining to the attack detection
process. iii) The second stage of TE, i.e., the entity pair to
path mapping, relates entities to nodes and can potentially be
tuned to aid detection, without changing the traffic distribution
derived in stage 1. In light of these remarks, we proceed to
study the distinct effects of minimizing the maximum link load
(TE stage 1) on the detection process, regardless of any stage
2 TE approach. The tuning of TE stage 2 to detection purposes
follows in Section III-D, based on relation extraction.
Assume that an attack floods a link l with capacity Cl
affecting a target node, as shown in Fig. 2. At this point, let the
aggregate attack traffic be M ≤ Cl. A link load-minimizing TE
scheme will reply by distributing the load of l over additional
paths “parallel” to the congested. By definition of the min-max
link utilization objective, no new path has 100% load after
the TE step (assuming a non-saturated network). Therefore,
flooding at least one of the parallel paths (including l) will
require the increase of the aggregate attack traffic to M ′ ≥M .
In response to the TE run, the attacker may choose to attack
“vertically”, indeed flooding some or all of the deployed parallel
links as required. However, the bandwidth emanating from each
Table I: Effects of attack responses on the L and R specificity of a detected
entity→target relation.
Attacker’s response types
V He Ha
L+, R± L+, R− L−, R+
of the attacker’ entities is upper bounded to avoid raising direct
suspicions of flooding attempts [2]. Therefore, it is valid to
assume that the number of entities participating to the attack,
nE , increases with their total coerced load, i.e.,:
M ′ ≥M ⇒ n′E ≥ nE (12)
Assuming that the total number of entities available to the
attacker is upper bounded, increasing nE means that each
entity must participate to attacks more frequently. Therefore,
in accordance with Lemma 2, we conclude:
Proposition 4. Vertical attacks favor the L-specificity of
detected associative relations (L+).
The effect of vertical attacks to R-specificity may not
be deduced independently of the 2nd TE stage. The newly
deployed parallel paths may simply implicate more nodes than
those present at the right side of an existing E → N relation,
decreasing R-specificity. However, other mappings may, e.g.,
divide N into node subsets that are routed via link-disjoint
paths, increasing R-specificity in the face of a vertical attack.
Alternatively, an attacker may choose to reply “horizontally”,
towards the “efferent” direction (He), in an effort to deliberately
decrease the R-specificity of E → N relations. Links further
from the target area are likely to affect the routing of more
nodes, increasing ‖N‖. However, such links will have greater
nominal capacity for the same reason. This hypothesis is further
reinforced by the over-provisioned nature of backbone links,
capacity-wise. It is not uncommon for links to have a nominal
capacity several times greater than the traffic demands of the
served nodes [12]. Thus, attacking links towards He is expected
to require increased entity participation in the general case.
Therefore, similarly to Proposition 4 we conclude the following:
Proposition 5. Horizontal-efferent attacks increase the L-
specificity and decrease the R-specificity of detected associative
relations (L+, R−).
Working similarly, we deduce the duality of the “Horizontal-
afferent” attacks, i.e., attacks to links closer to the target area:
Proposition 6. Horizontal-afferent attacks decrease the L-
specificity and increase the R-specificity of detected associative
relations (L−, R+).
Remark 7. We note that an attack must be horizontally bounded,
i.e., not moving indefinitely towards Ha or He. Flooding
links too near to the target area may give away the attack
by minimizing the R-specificity of the detected relations. On
the other hand, attacks too far from the target may actually
miss their objective, affecting the connectivity of other nodes
instead of the intended target, or demand too much bandwidth.
The effects of the attacker’s responses are summarized in
Table I. Notice that concurrent combinations of response types
over a given path are also possible. In this case, however, due
to Remark 1, the associative relations r observed after the
attacker’s response will overlap as rHe ⊇ rV ⊇ rHa , yielding
the specificity effects of the efferent-most attack. We observe
that each of the attacker’s responses yields a gain in either L
or R-specificity, enforcing at least one of the relations (8), (9)
or (10). Therefore:
Lemma 8. The first stage of a min-max link utilization TE
objective facilitates the detection of attacks at a given time
step by increasing the L or R-specificity of the observed entity-
to-target relations.
Notice that Lemma 8 does not at first preclude attack
strategies, i.e., series of attacker responses that may yield
a solid loss in specificity over a time horizon. For instance,
if He and Ha constantly yield
〈
L+1, R−1
〉
and
〈
L−10, R+1
〉
(using arbitrary units), then continuous alternations between
the two responses would produce an unbounded loss in L-
specificity with no effects on the R-specificity. However, the
feasibility of such a strategy depends on the 2nd TE stage,
which quantifies the exact losses/gains in L/R-specificity. We
therefore proceed next to directly optimize the 2nd TE stage
according to formulation (4), favoring the detection process.
D. Incorporation of Associative Relation Extraction to Classic
TE Formulations
Let rt : e
s→ n be an observed relation with total support s
at time step t. The goal of formulation (4) is to minimize s at
time t+ 1, assuming that rt represents a false positive.
Let dest(ef , t) return the destination of any flow ef origi-
nating from entity e at time t, noticing that dest(ef , t) 6= n in
general, by definition of the studied Crossfire attacks [2]. In
addition, let Ht represent the history of the destinations of ef :
Ht : {dest(ef , τ), τ ∈ [1, t]} (13)
Given Ht, a false-positive flow may retain its destination
(affecting n or not) at t + 1 with probability Pret(ef ) =
P (dest (ef , t+ 1) = dest (ef , t)|Ht), or alter it to any other
node m 6= dest (ef , t) (including null) with probability
Pm(ef ) = P (dest (ef , t+ 1) = m|Ht). Let P aret(ef ) and
P am(ef ) denote the probabilities of a flow ef affecting n again
at time t + 1 due to this normal behavior justified by Ht.
Minimizing the support s is then tantamount to minimizing the
total probability of re-enforcing the relation e→ n at t+ 1:
P at+1(e) =
∑
∀ef
Pret(ef ) · P aret(ef ) +∑
∀m 6=dest(e,t)
Pm(ef ) · P am(ef )

(14)
Firstly, we proceed to minimize the term Pret(ef ) · P aret(ef ).
Note that the term Pret(ef ) is invariant to any defender’s
actions, while Pret(ef ) 6= 0 in the general case. We thus
proceed to minimize the term P aret(ef ):
Remark 9. P aret(ef ) = 0 when the pairs 〈ef , dest(ef , t)〉 and
〈origin, n〉 are mapped to link-disjoint paths in T (t+ 1).
The identity of the origin (Fig. 1) may not be known,
especially during the first attack rounds. Therefore, Remark 9
is practically implemented by mapping 〈ef , dest(ef , t)〉 to a
path that is link-disjoint from 〈s (l) , n〉 ∀flooded(l) at time t,
s (l) being the source node of l.
Secondly, we attempt to minimize the term
∑
∀m
Pm(ef ) ·
P am(ef ) of equation (14). Let M(t+ 1) be the set of possible
destinations m of ef , m 6= dest(ef , t), affecting n in T (t+ 1)
via one or more links (i.e., potential attack points). It holds
that:
Pm(ef ) · P am(ef ) =
∑
∀m∈M(t+1)
P (dest (ef , t+ 1) = m|Ht) (15)
In order to minimize equation (15), we employ virtual links
[13] and proceed as follows:
Lemma 10. The configuration of the routing tables T (t+ 1)
minimizes
∑
∀m
Pm(ef ) · P am(ef ) when the following conditions
hold: i) It connects origin to n via a virtual link, ii) The
virtual link comprises the smallest number of physical links
(i.e., shortest path), iii) The nodes along the virtual link are
the most improbable destinations of ef at time t+ 1.
Proof: Condition (i) ensures that the set M (t+ 1) of
equation (15) contains only the intermediate nodes encountered
on the single, physical path represented by the virtual link.
Without virtual linking, any physical link on the path from
origin to n may serve any number of additional nodes, in-
creasing ‖M (t+ 1)‖. Condition (ii) ensures that ‖M (t+ 1)‖
has the minimal value supported by the network. Condition
(iii) then minimizes
∑
∀m∈M(t+1)
P (dest (ef , t+ 1) = m|Ht)
by selecting the ‖M (t+ 1)‖ nodes with the lowest
P (dest (ef , t+ 1) = m|Ht) values throughout the network.
In order to circumvent the probably unknown identity of the
origin, we work as in Remark 9, replacing origin with s(l)
and repeating Lemma 10 for every flooded(l) at time t.
Finally, the combination of Remark 9 and Lemma 10 leads
to the following Theorem.
Theorem 11. Let rt : e
s→ n be an associative relation
detected at time t. Let ef be a flow originating from e at time
t. If the detection is falsely positive, the routing T (t+ 1) that
minimizes the support s at time t+ 1:
i) Routes 〈ef , dest(ef , t)〉 and 〈origin, n〉 via link-disjoint
paths, ∀ef . ii) Routes 〈origin, n〉 via a virtual link comprising
the most improbable future destinations of e, ∀ef . If all future
destinations are equi-probable, 〈origin, n〉 is routed via the
hop-wise shortest path between origin and n.
Qualitatively, Theorem 11 facilitates detection by forcing
attacking entities to: i) constantly open new connections, and ii)
use improbable decoys in the process. Notice that it also covers
the total support of a relation up to t+1, which is expressed as
the probability Pat+1(e) =
∏t+1
τ=1 P
a
τ (e). The theorem greedily
reduces Pat+1(e) by minimizing each of the P aτ (e) terms.
Regarding its incorporation to a min-max link utilization TE
scheme, the theorem can be implemented at the entity pair to
path mapping phase (TE stage 2). This phase maps each of
the entity pairs to one of the physical paths connecting them,
keeping the total load of each path near its optimal value. For
each ef , we first map 〈ef , dest(ef , t)〉 to an arbitrary path.
Then, we proceed to list all available link-disjoint paths for
〈origin, n〉, following Theorem 11. If a pair of link-disjoint
paths is not supported by the topology, we select paths with joint
links as close as possible to origin or n, employing Remark 7.
Finally, we map 〈origin, n〉 to the returned path with the lowest∑
∀m∈path
P (dest (ef , t+ 1) = m|Ht) value. Notice that flows
with common source and destination nodes are treated as an
aggregated flow, via the same routing rules. Finally, all non-
suspicious entity pairs are then mapped to links arbitrarily. The
process has an average complexity of O (‖Rt‖ ·K · S · F ),
where Rt is the set of observed relations rt, K is the average
number of physical paths per node pair, S is the average number
of links comprising a path, and F is the average number of
flows originating from any entity.
Theorem 11 also provides an insight on the topological
attributes that affect the vulnerability of a network to Crossfire-
like link-flooding attacks. Consider a full mesh topology, where
all nodes are equi-probable flow destinations. According to part
(ii) of the Theorem, the pair 〈origin, n〉 will always be routed
via the shortest paths. However, in a mesh topology these
paths always have a length of 1 hop and, therefore, contain no
intermediate decoys. Thus, a Crossfire attack is not possible
and the network is invulnerable. In essence, the longer the paths
offered by a topology, the more the possible decoy nodes and
the better the probability of launching Crossfire successfully.
E. On Reducing Complexity by Dissolving Infrequent Relations
While Theorem 11 can be implemented with linear com-
plexity w.r.t. the number of observed relations, certain special
cases may require additional attention. Firstly, an attacker
may employ a very large number of entities for an attack.
Secondly, sizable networks may yield too many probable
attack targets. In addition, a single entity may be used for
attacking multiple targets at once, increasing the number of
observed relations further. Therefore, a defender may need to
reduce ‖Rt‖ by dissolving some relations deterministically. The
process is context-specific, depending on the capabilities and
requirements of the defender. For instance, a top-x approach
can be employed, keeping only the x relations with the greatest
support. Another approach is to dissolve relations that have not
been observed within a given timeout period. Another similar
approach, advocated by well-known metaheuristics (e.g., ant
colony optimization [14]) is to introduce a notion of “strength”.
The strength of a relation (which is not related to its support)
is a number that increases every time the relation is observed,
but otherwise decreases as time elapses. If the strength reaches
a zero value, the relation is dissolved.
Regardless of the employed approach, the dissolution method
must be carefully selected, since it may work in favor of the
attacker. For instance, assume that an entity participates in each
Input: The flooded links LA at time t; The entities El with new
connections present in each l ∈ L; The nodes Nl
affected by each l ∈ L; The traffic matrix M .
Output: The relations (5), (6), (7) at time t; the new routing
configuration at time t+ 1, i.e., T (t+ 1).
/* Initialization. */
1 Create persistent database tables REL, RLN ;
/* Remove shadowed links. */
2 foreach l ∈ LA do
3 if ∃l∗ ∈ LA : El∗ → Nl∗ ⊇ El → Nl then
4 LA L99 LA − l;
5 end
6 end
/* Update Database. */
7 foreach l ∈ LA do
8 REL L99 REL
⋃ {〈 = e, λ = l, τ = t〉 , ∀e ∈ El};
9 RLN L99 RLN
⋃ {〈λ = l, ν = n, τ = t〉 , ∀n ∈ Nl};
10 end
/* Produce Relations. */
11 ∀e ∈ REL : e s→ ?, s = ‖σ=eREL‖;
12 ∀n ∈ RLN : ? s→ n, s = ‖σν=nRLN‖;
13 ∀ 〈e, n〉 ∈
(
R : REL
λ
./ RLN
)
: e
s→ n, s = ‖σ R‖
〈,ν〉=〈e,n〉
;
/* Dissolve Relations by TimeOut. */
14 REL L99 REL − στ<t−TimeOutREL;
15 RLN L99 RLN − στ<t−TimeOutRLN ;
/* Perform TE. */
16 Calculate optimal load fractions f via formulation (11);
17 Produce T (t+ 1) via Theorem 11;
Algorithm 1: The proposed ARIEL scheme.
step of an attack with probability p. Let g(t) be the strength
gathered by the associated relations, which can be increased
by a > 0 and decreased by b > 0 at each step. Consider that g
is nullified for the first time at t+ τ . Then, it must hold that:
g(t)+a·p·τ−b·(1−p)·τ = 0 g(t)≥0⇒ [a · p− b · (1− p)]·τ < 0
(16)
Therefore, since τ > 0, we deduce that: p < b/(a+b).
In other words, if an attacker uses a p value of less than
b/(a+b), then his bot relations and thus his attack will be stealthy.
Different dissolution approaches yield different behaviors.
For instance, if the defender follows a τ−timeout approach,
a relation will be dissolved if not observed for τ time steps,
i.e., with probability P = (1 − p)τ . Therefore, an attacker
may choose a p value which ensures that P is below a
threshold. However, the attacker should have the necessary
number of entities ‖E‖ at his disposal to take advantage of
dissolution in any case, taking into account that his attacks
should be successful with just ‖E‖ · p entities. On the other
hand, the defender should be aware of the trade-off resulting
from his relation dissolution approach, and carefully balance
computational complexity and detection potential.
IV. ALGORITHMIC FORMULATION
The analytical findings of Section III lead to the formulation
of Algorithm 1 (Associative RelatIon Extraction aLgorithm
- ARIEL). The formulation allows for a straightforward
implementation based on a relational database, exploiting the
performance, stability and scalability benefits of this mature
technology (e.g., SQL [7]). Therefore, we employ the additional
notation of σcR to express the selection of rows of a table R
yielding true to the binary predicate condition c. In addition,
R1
col
./ R2 will denote the natural join of tables R1 and R2
on column col. ARIEL requires two persistent database tables,
REL and RLN with the columns detailed in lines 8− 9. The
tables are created at the initialization phase. Subsequent runs
of ARIEL utilize the same table instances as detailed next.
ARIEL is executed on a link-flooding event, after the exe-
cution of any extra heuristics for flow classification (e.g., [9]).
The set containing the flooded links at the time of execution t is
denoted as LA. The entities present in each l ∈ LA are denoted
as El, while Nl contains the nodes whose traffic is routed via
l. The defender may utilize common network logs to deduce
which connections did not exist at t− 1 [15]. ARIEL performs
the task of attack detection at lines 2− 15 and min-max link
utilization TE at lines 16 − 17. Firstly, links that will lead
to extraneous relations are filtered out of LA, in accordance
with Remark 1 (lines 2 − 6). The process can be completed
with an average of O (‖LA‖ · log ‖LA‖ · El [‖Nl‖+ ‖El‖])
calculations, given that the process can be treated as a
partial sorting of the elements of LA by the ⊇ operator.
Each comparison operation then requires O (El [‖Nl‖+ ‖El‖])
computations, El [∗] denoting the average of ∗ with regard to
variable l. At steps 7− 10 ARIEL populates the tables REL
and RLN by processing El, Nl as required by definition (3),
while also adding timestamp information. The complexity is
O (‖LA‖ · El [‖Nl‖+ ‖El‖]).
The detected associative relations are produced in lines 11−
13. As explained in Section III, an attacker may attempt to
obfuscate the attacking entities or the attack target. At line 11,
ARIEL attempts to detect all suspicious entities, regardless of
target (e→ ?), in case the latter is obfuscated. For each distinct
entity e, the support is proportional to the counting of all REL
entries containing e. A similar approach is followed at line 12
to detect possible attack targets, regardless of the attacker’s
identity. Finally, the relations e → n are derived from the
natural join of REL and RLN over the links λ, at line 13. Notice
that the support of the produced relations is not normalized in
[0, 1] as stated in equations (8-10). The normalization is skipped
since it is trivial and reduces the clarity of the presentation of
ARIEL. The complexity is O (‖REL‖+ ‖RLN‖), assuming
that the database uses a hash approach to implement the join [7].
The algorithm then proceeds to dissolve “old” relations at
lines 14− 15 by removing the corresponding entries from the
tables REL and RLN . The timeout approach is used as an
example. Alternative dissolution approaches can be freely used
at this point. The complexity is O (‖REL‖+ ‖RLN‖).
The TE task is accomplished at lines 16−17. The complexity
of the optimal link load calculation (line 16) depends on
the employed LP solver [16]. Finally, the detection-oriented
mapping of entity pairs to paths follows Theorem 11, whose
process and complexity has been described in Section III-D.
V. SIMULATIONS
We next perform simulations to study the effects of i) the TE
phases (load spreading, entity mapping), and ii) the topological
attributes on the specificity of relations extracted by ARIEL.
The simulator, which we plan to release as a free open-source
application, is implemented on the AnyLogic platform [17].
Setup. The simulations assume one synthetic and 50 real
topologies (listed in the x-axis of Fig. 7, derived from the
Internet Topology Zoo [18]). The synthetic topology comprises
25 nodes arranged in a 5× 5 square grid. In every topology,
all links are set to a capacity of 10GBps. Furthermore, two
alternative, link-disjoint paths are considered for each node-
pair. In addition, each topology hosts a flat number of 10, 000
benign entities and 10, 000 bots, equally distributed to all nodes.
This selection corresponds to a botnet of considerable size, i.e.,
the number of bots is equal to the total number of network
users. Each entity (benign or bot) is allowed to have up to 5
connections opened at any given time. The origin and the attack
target are selected as the most distant node pair (considering
their hop-wise shortest path) in each topology. Time t is slotted,
advancing at steps of 1 on link-flooding events (as in Section
III), up to t = 20. The attacker operates as described in Section
II. The bandwidth of each connection, flowbw, is flat for bots
or benign entities. Given a simulation configuration, flowbw
needs to be calibrated to enable Crossfire. Too low flowbw is
insufficient for link-flooding, while too high means that the
whole network is flooded. We choose the lowest flowbw that
enables the attack and provide this value at each Figure.
For the sake of experimentation, we define the input
parameters reuse_ratio and rehome_ratio, pertaining to bot
and benign connections. A reuse_ratio = 10 means that
10% of the active bot connections at time t, will re-adapt
their destinations to participate in the attack at time t + 1.
The remaining 90% will remain unaltered. Similarly, the
rehome_ratio defines how many benign connections will
change their destination to a (uniformly) random node at time
t + 1. Finally, the metric ∆s in introduced to quantify the
specificity of detected relations. ∆s is defined as the average
(not normalized) support of relations involving bots/target
nodes, minus the average support of relations involving
benign entities/any other node. A higher ∆s value means
that bots/target nodes stand out more and, therefore, can be
detected more efficiently. Finally, all runs are repeated for 95%
confidence in the results.
Results. Figure 3 studies the general effects of TE on the
efficiency of Crossfire attacks. Using the synthetic topology, we
start with a bot connection reuse_ratio = 0%. In just two time
steps, the attacker has run out of available bots (Fig. 3a) and
is unable to flood the targeted links (Fig. 3b). A reuse_ratio
of 25% increases the number of available bots to ≈ 75%, but
their total connections are still insufficient for a successful
attack. Thus, the attacker is forced to a reuse_ratio = 50%
which i) makes all bots visible (nearly 100% participation, Fig.
3a), while ii) achieving marginally successful attacks. It is at
a reuse_ratio = 75% when the attacks become consistently
successful, should the defender use a random flow mapping
at the 2nd TE phase. The proposed optimal mapping makes
even the reuse_ratio = 75% insufficient, forcing the attacker
to: i) use all his bots, and ii) use them almost exclusively for
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(a) Effects of TE phase 1 (load balancing) on the bot
availability.
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(b) Effects of TE phase 2 (flow mapping to paths) on the
attack success ratio.
Figure 3: The effects of two TE phases on the number of bots drawn to an
attack and its success ratio. The reuse_ratio is varied in 0−75%. (Calibrated
flowbw = 400KBps, rehome_ratio = 10%).
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Figure 4: Effects of optimal/random mapping on the specificity of the  s→ ?
relations. (Calibrated flowbw = 400KBps, rehome_ratio = 10%).
attacks, accentuating their detection.
This becomes evident in Fig. 4, where ∆s is doubled when
the optimal mapping is used. We note that these findings
are aligned to the theoretical hypotheses and conclusions of
Sections III-C and III-D on the effects of TE on the detection
process. Specifically, a load-balancing TE is shown to naturally
force an attacker to use more bots to remain effective. In
addition, the optimal mapping speeds up the detection. Notice
that the random mapping yields a strictly increasing specificity
as well, albeit at a slower rate.
We proceed to study specifically the effectiveness of an
attacker’s attempt to obfuscate his bots and his targets, cor-
responding to Lemmas 2 and 3. The flowbw is deliberately
increased to yield a very congested network, in order to make
attacks possible with less bots. Then, in Fig. 5, the reuse_ratio
is varied from a high to a low value. As lower values are used,
the bots participate to the attacks less frequently, which reduces
the specificity of → ? relations as expected by Lemma 2. At
this point we also note that timing-out relations as described
in Section III-E has the exact same effect.
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Figure 5: Effects of probabilistic bot participation to an attack on the specificity
of the  s→ ? relations. The reuse_ratio ratio is varied between 20− 100%.
(Calibrated flowbw = 1400KBps, rehome_ratio = 10%).
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Figure 6: Effects of attacking random nodes (apart from the target) on the
specificity of the ? s→ n relations. The rehome_ratio is varied between
20− 100%. (Calibrated flowbw = 3500KBps, reuse_ratio = 100%).
In Fig. 6 we set the flowbw to a value where the re-homing
of benign connections causes link-flooding events by itself.
The higher the rehome_ratio, the more the naturally flooded
links. In this manner, the attacker is expected to obfuscate his
targeted nodes, as stated by Lemma 6. The results validate
the theoretical claim, and the specificity of ? → n relations
reduces when the rehome_ratio increases.
Finally, we proceed to test ARIEL in real topologies in
Fig. 7. The topologies are random, selected alphabetically by
name in the Topology Zoo database. Due to space restrictions,
we illustrate the achieved specificity of the  → ? relations,
given that the detection of the bots may be the first priority
for the mitigation of the attack. ARIEL yields positive ∆s in
all cases, albeit with varying end-value at t = 20. To better
understand the causes of this behavior, we tested the correlation
between ∆s(t = 20) and several topology metrics (centrality,
average number of neighbors, average shortest path length-
AvgSPL, number of nodes, diameter, clustering coefficient,
network density and network heterogeneity [19]). The AvgSPL
metric exhibited the strongest covariance with ∆s, as shown in
Fig. 7. Specifically, the two plots yield a Pearson correlation
coefficient of 0.7, with P = 10−8 [20]. This outcome is
aligned to Theorem 11, showing that topologies that offer
longer paths between nodes are more vulnerable to attacks.
However, the higher the vulnerability (higher AvgSPL), the
better the detection result. We note though that this correlation
is statistical and outliers exist (e.g., the “CrlNetServices”
topology in Fig. 7). Nonetheless, the AvgSPL constitutes a
good metric for an initial estimation of the vulnerability of the
network, based on its topology.
Future work. We plan the following extensions. i) The
formulation of the attacker’s responses (Table I) paves the way
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Figure 7: Effects of different topologies on the specificity of the  s→ ?
relations. The effect is strongly correlated to the average-shortest-path-length
(avg. SPL) topology metric.
for a game-theoretic approach, where the goal is to derive
optimal attack and defense strategies. ii) Novel topological
metrics should be defined to quantify the vulnerability of a
network deterministically. iii) Noticing that the plots of Fig.
3a-6 are very well-formed (e.g., linear), we target the derivation
of the exact formulas that govern the involved metrics.
VI. RELATED WORK
Studer et al. introduce the Coremelt attack [3], where swarms
of attack bots send traffic between each other in order to
cause significant congestion within core network links, as
collateral damage. The Crossfire attack [2]uses bots as sources
and decoy servers as destinations, but falls within the same class
of attacks. Research around such attacks has focused mostly on
the system’s side for detection. For example, Xue et al. propose
the LinkScope system for detecting malicious link floods and
for locating the target link or area whenever possible [8]. Their
system uses end-to-end and hop-by-hop network measurement
techniques to detect abrupt degradation of performance. The
survey of Bhuyan et al. [21] gives an overview of the methods
and tools used for detecting DDoS attacks; these range from
statistical methods to machine-learning heuristic approaches.
Zargar et al. [22] further present a comprehensive classification
of various defense mechanisms against DDoS flooding attacks.
In contrast to these studies, we propose a novel model and
analysis of a joint detection and mitigation approach.
Several related DoS attack types have been studied in light
of the SDN paradigm shift as well. Braga et al. capitalize on
controller features for traffic analysis using Self Organizing
Maps (SOMs) to classify flows and enable DDoS attack
detection caused by heavy hitters [23]. Ashraf et al. provide a
general survey of machine learning approaches for mitigating
DDoS attacks in SDN environments [24]. Lim et al. propose
a SDN-based scheme to block botnet-based DDoS attacks
that do not exhibit detectable statistical anomalies [25]. The
recent work of Lee et al. (CoDef) [26] is a first approach
towards defeating new link-flooding attacks such as Coremelt
and Crossfire. The authors propose a cooperative TE-based
detection method for identifying low-rate attack traffic. The
traffic sources and targets need to communicate directly via
an extra protocol. Malicious traffic sources are identified by
not complying with the instructed re-routing requests. Finally,
Gkounis [27] studies the practical challenges of using SDN to
implement a joint detection and mitigation scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work introduced a novel framework for studying
distributed link-flooding attacks. The goal of the framework
is to facilitate the detection of susceptible bots and targeted
network areas. This objective was formulated in terms of
relational algebra and was seamlessly incorporated to standard
TE modules. The analysis provided insights on optimizing
the detection process, isolating the impact of the attacker
and facilitating proper defender’s reactions to the detection.
Moreover, it shed light on the topological attributes that
significantly influence the vulnerability of a network, attack-
wise. The analytical insights were validated via extensive
simulations on a variety of real and synthetic topologies.
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